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COMMENT

Reintroducing the Mexican Wolf: Will
the Public Share the Costs, or Will the
Burden Be Borne By a Few?
Mexican wolves and cattle just don't get along. Yet, the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) expects them to live in harmony
when the agency establishes a permanent population of approximately 120
Mexican wolves in rural areas of Western New Mexico and Eastern
Arizona; areas where approximately 80,000 head of privately owned cattle
roam. FWS and area ranchers agree that the reintroduced predators will kill
cattle. However, the groups disagree about the number of kills that will take
place and who should bear the cost of feeding the reintroduced wolves.
The Mexican wolf reintroduction program is not unique. FWS previously reintroduced the Red wolf in North Carolina and the Northern Gray
wolf in the Yellowstone Park area of Wyoming. There has been a great deal
of debate about the wisdom of these programs, including a significant
amount of debate among constitutional law scholars regarding the Fifth
Amendment implications that might arise when reintroduced predators
prey on privately owned livestock. Not surprisingly, commentators flooded
the pages of law reviews with differing views on whether livestock depredations by a reintroduced predator amounts to a Fifth Amendment
taking.1 One writer indicated that such depredation might even give rise to
a Bivens2 action against the agency official responsible for the predator's
conduct?
The issues raised by the Mexican wolf reintroduction program are
emotional and highly charged. Wolves are majestic creatures that deserve
protection. Steps must be taken, however, to prevent the federal government and a majority its citizens from trampling the constitutional rights
1. Anna R.C. Casperson, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Impossibility of
"Takings" by Wildltf, 23 B.C. ENVIr. AFF. L REv. 357 (1996); Robert C. Moore, Comment, The
Pack is Back: The Political,Social, and Ecological Effects of the Reintroduction of the GrayWolf To
Yellowstone NationalParkand CentralIdaho, 12 T.M. CoOLEY L. REv. 647 (1995); Dale D. Goble,
Of Wolves and Welfare Ranching, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 101 (1992); Jeffrey E. Thompson,
Note, Damage Causedby Reintroduced IW~dlife: Should the Government be Held Accountable, 1992
U. IL. L REV. 1183 (1992); James S. Burling, Takings, The Endangered Species Act, and Related
Laws, 27 LAND &WATER L. REV 309 (1992); Geoffrey L. Harrison, Comment, The Endangered
Species Act and Ursine Usurpations:A Grizzly Tale of Two Takings, 58 U. COI. L REV. 1101 (1991).
2. A Bivens action is an implied cause of action under the Constitution whereby a
citizen may seek damages from a federal officer when that officer infringes upon his
constitutional rights. Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens ConstitutionalTort: An Unfulfilled Promise,
67 N.C. L. REv. 337 (1989).
3. James S. Burling, Takings, The Endangered Species Act, and Related Laws, 27 LAND &
WATER L. REv 309,361 (1992).
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of a rural minority. In a purely academic sense, the above commentators
who conclude that depredations of livestock by reintroduced predators
amount to a taking under the Fifth Amendment present a persuasive
argument. Furthermore, a Bivens action presents academic appeal when
federal agents allow the reintroduced predators to destroy privately owned
livestock. However, because the process required for a livestock owner to
prevail under either theory is economically unfeasible, a "takings" or Bivens
action is simply not an acceptable method for restoring constitutional rights
destroyed when reintroduced wolves kill privately owned livestock. Both
the taxpayer and the livestock owner are better served by a final rule that
includes a compensation program. Accordingly, this comment concludes
with a proposed administrative procedure for compensating livestock
owners that is fair, efficient, and respectful of the Constitution.
PART I: THE MEXICAN WOLF REINTRODUCTION PROGRAM
The Mexican wolf once roamed relatively undisturbed in the
Southwestern United States and Mexico. However, in the early 1900s, a new
wave of settlers moved to the Southwest. The settlers did not come alone;
they brought herds of livestock that became a staple of the wolf's diet. The
financial losses caused by wolf depredations culminated in a governmentbacked initiative to eradicate the wolves. Within 15 years, Mexican wolf
numbers spiraled downward. This government initiative lasted until
approximately 1960. The wolf gained endangered species status in 1976 and
efforts to re-establish the wolf population began shortly thereafter.
On June 8,1995, Fish and Wildlife Service Region 2 Director, Nancy
M. Kaufman, issued a draft environmental impact statement (Draft EIS)
addressing the impacts of reintroducing the Mexican wolf. The Draft EIS
contains the FWS's proposal for reintroducing the wolves and three
alternative approaches to re-establishing the subspecies under the
Endangered Species Act." The Draft EIS specifies a target release date of
spring 1997. However, as of January 1,1998, the Mexican wolves slated for
release remained captive in one-third acre pens located in the Apache
National Forest, awaiting an order from the Secretary of Interior which will
set them free. Although FWS officials missed the target date originally
proposed in the EIS, on March 29,1998 the Secretary of the Interior ordered
the wolves be released in the Blue Range area of Eastern Arizona.

4. FISH & WILDUFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTEiOR, DRAFt ENVTL. IMPACr
STATEMENT-RENTRODUCrION OF THE MEXICAN WOLF WITHIN ITS HISTORiC RANGE IN THE
SOuTHWESTERN UNITED STATES (1995).
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A. Selecting and Releasing: Where Do They Come From and How Will
They be Let Go?
Federal agencies believe that the entire living population of
Mexican wolves resides in various zoos and wildlife parks in Mexico and
the United States.5 The reintroduced population of wolves will consist of
"non-essential" wolves from FWS's captive breeding population.' Because
these wolves were born and raised in captivity, FWS has moved them to
large pens on the Sevilleta Wildlife Refuge.
After a short stay at Sevilleta, the wolves will be moved to pens
inside the primary recovery area and FWS employees will begin a sort of
training program to prepare the wolves for life in the wild.7 The employees
will attempt to teach the captivity-raised wolves predatory skills and how
to recognize native prey. In addition, the wolves will undergo "aversive
conditioning to livestock and humans."8 Once the wolves have been trained
and conditioned, FWS will select pairs for release based on "reproductive
performance, behavioral compatibility, response to the adaptation process,
and other factors."9
Once FWS selects pairs of wolves for release, the agency will begin
"soft-releasing" the wolves. Soft releasing is thought to keep the wolves
from rapidly dispersing from the release area.'0 The soft release program
begins by moving the wolves to the release site and holding them in on-site
cages for several months. The wolves are allowed to "breed, den, and whelp
in the pens and exposure to humans is minimized."" After the wolves
adjust, they are released from the on-site holding pens. FWS employees will
scatter native food around the release area until the wolves begin hunting
on their own.
B. Where Will the Wolves Be Released?
FWS's proposal recommends reintroducing the Mexican wolves in
the Blue Range of Western Arizona and, if feasible, on the White Sands
Missile Range in south central New Mexico.' The release areas are divided

5.
6.
7.
8.

See id. at 1-1.

See id. at 2-7.
See id. at 2-20.
Id. at 2-1.

9. See

FisH & WILDm

SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, DRAFT ENVYL. IMFACr

STATEMENT-REINTRODUCTION OF THE MEXICAN WOLF WITHIN ITS HISTORIC RANGE IN THE

SOIIWESTERN UNITED STATES at 2-2 (1995).

10. See id.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 2-7.
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up into primary and secondary recovery areas. The primary recovery area
is a relatively small amount of land surrounding the initial release sites. The
secondary recovery areas encompass more significant amounts of land. The
wolves will be allowed to roam undisturbed into the secondary recovery
areas. However, when they stray outside the secondary recovery area, FWS
will attempt to capture and relocate them to a location within the recovery
area 14

The Blue Range Wolf Recovery Area is comprised of 4,386,245 acres
of land in Eastern Arizona and Western New Mexico."5 The recovery area
is home to an estimated 57,170 deer and approximately 15,800 Elk.16 Smaller
numbers of Javelina, Pronghorn, and Rocky Mountain Bighorn Sheep also
live in the area. Livestock owners graze approximately 82,600 cattle on
grazing allotments and private ranches within the Blue Range Recovery
Area." In addition, around 7,000 sheep graze near the northern boundary
of the recovery area and numerous ranch horses graze throughout the
recovery area.'s
Comprised of 2,578,026 acres of generally arid land, the White
Sands Wolf Recovery Area is significantly smaller than the Blue Range
Area." Approximately 7,500 mule deer, 350 Pronghorn, 1,700 Oryx', 1,800
wild horses 2', and 30 endangered Desert Bighorn Sheep inhabit the area. 22
Approximately 2,120 cattle graze within the extreme Western portion of the
White Sands Recovery Area.23 In addition, the United States Department of

13.
14.

See id. 2-15.
See id.

15.

See FISH & WIw ur

SERV., U.S. DEW'T OF INTERIOR, DRAFT ENVTL. IMPACT

STATEMENT-RENTRODUCTION OF THE MEXICAN WOLF WITHIN ITS

HIsORIC RAN

E IN THE

SOUTWESTERN UNTED STATES 34 (1995).

16. See id. at 3-8.
17. See id. at 3-15.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 3-36.
20. See id. at 3-41, 3-42. Oryx are not native to the White Sands Recovery Area. The
animals have long, extremely sharp horns that they use to defend themselves. Oryx have no
real predators in the White Sands Recovery Area other than humans. See id. Considering the
Oryx's natural defense mechanism, it is unlikely that the reintroduced Mexican wolves will
prey on them.
21. These wild horses are not protected by the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros
Act, Pub. L. No. 92-195 § 4, 85 Stat. 650 (1971). The White Sands Recovery Area is entirely
comprised of military land and the Act does not apply to wild horse living on military land.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994).
22. New Mexico law designates the Desert Bighorn Sheep as endangered. N.M. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 19, § 33.1.8.1.1 (1998).
23. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTEIuoR, DRAFT ENVTL. IMPACT
STAT MEN- RmNTRoDUcnoN oF THE MEXLCAN WOLF WrrTN ITS HSoRIc RANGE IN THE
SOUrTHESTERN UNITED STATES 3-49 (1995).

Spring 1998]

REINTRODUCING THE MEXICAN WOLF

Agriculture grazes 1,100 cattle, 300 sheep and "a small
number of horses"
4
in the far Southwest portion of the recovery area.
C. Fish and Wildlife Service Wolf Management
FWS has a pervasive management scheme in mind for the
reintroduced Mexican wolves. Initially, the wolves may be equipped with
radio collars containing a remotely activated tranquilizer dart.25
Theoretically, this equipment will allow FWS to track the wolves'
movements and if a wolf strays outside the recovery areas, 3 to activate the
tranquilizer. The agency will then move the straying wolf to an area within
the recovery area.
FWS also claims that the agency will remove wolves from private
land if the landowner requests that it do so.27 If the landowner does not
request removal, the agency will take no action to remove the wolves from
the land. However, if certain wolves become a nuisance to humans or begin
having unreasonably adverse effects on livestock or wildlife, the agency will
take measures to remove them.3
D. Protecting the Wolves and Protecting Private Property: Has Fish and
Wildlife Succeeded?
The reintroduction program proposed by FWS is a somewhat
laudable effort to comply with the mandates of the Endangered Species Act,
while giving some protection to property owners who will be affected by
the reintroduced Mexican wolves. Not surprisingly, however, the agency's
effort seems to have pleased nobody and has been attacked from all
directions. Wildlife conservation groups are concerned that the program
does not provide adequate protection for the endangered predator.
Property owners, on the other hand, are concerned that the program does
not provide adequate protection for their livestock.

24. The public would bear the burden when Department of Agriculture livestock is
killed by wolves because tax dollars paid for the animals in the first place.
25. See id. at 2-2.
26. The wolves are not likely to adhere to the arbitrary boundaries drawnby FWS. Lone
wolves may travel great distances each day. Therefore, FWS must keep a close watch to
ensure that the wolves remain within the recovery areas. As discussed later in this article,
this "close watch' will likely be the factor that ultimately renders portions of this
reintroduction program constitutionally infirm.
27. See id. at 2-23.
28. See id. at 2-23,2-24.
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Although not without its problems, FWS's proposal appears to
adequately protect the reintroduced wolves.2 The FWS proposal suggests
different measures for protecting the wolves depending on whether the
human - wolf contact occurs on private or public land. On public land, FWS
has gone to great lengths to protect the wolves. When a conflict occurs on
private or tribal land, the protection measures are less but still seem to
adequately protect the predators.
The proposed reintroduction areas are largely comprised of public
land managed by the United States Forest Service (Blue Range) and the
United States Army (White Sands Missile Range). Much of this public land
is leased for grazing purposes. Thus, these areas are ripe for conflict when
the reintroduced wolves come into contact with the livestock that grazes the
land or the leaseholder that fears for his livestock's safety. FWS's proposal
addresses the actions that a livestock owner may take when wolves on
public land threaten his livestock.
On public land, when a wolf roams near livestock, a livestock
owner may "harass wolves for purposes of scaring them away from
livestock provided the harassment is promptly reported." The plan even
purports to allow livestock owners to "take" wolves that are "actually
engaged in attacking livestock."31 In reality, however, this latter provision
is essentially superfluous. The provision contains a caveat that requires the
livestock owner to jump through a significant number of hoops before the
offending wolf may be killed.
In order to kill a wolf on public land, a livestock owner must first
obtain permission from FWS.' FWS is not required to grant permission. In
fact, under the proposed rule, FWS cannot give permission to "take" a wolf
unless four requirements are met. First, there must be at least six breeding
pairs present if the take will occur in the Blue Range Wolf Recovery Area
or three breeding pairs if the take will occur in the White Sands Wolf
Recovery Area.' Second, FWS, Animal Damage Control, or State Wildlife
Agents must have documented losses of or injury to livestock by the

29. A major concern regarding protecting the released wolves appears to relate to wolf livestock conflicts. See The Return of El Lobo? Getting Close, THE ARIZ. REPUBUC, Dec. 27,1996,
at B6, availablein 1996 WL 7765553. Accordingly, in the interest of manageability, discussion
of the plan's protection measures is limited, to situations where humans, wolves, and
livestock may come into conflict.
30.

FIsH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, DRAFT ENvTL. IMPACT

STATEMENT- RINTRODUCTION OF THE MEXICAN WOLF WITIN ITS HIromc RANGE IN THE

ERN UNITED STATES 2-21 (1995).
SOM
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
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reintroduced wolves on previous occasions.3 Third, FWS must be given the
first opportunity to control the "offending wolves."3' Fourth, the livestock
that an attack occurred at the
owner must produce "physical evidence ...
time of the take."3' Finally, the livestock owner must promptly report the
take.
These measures seem to adequately protect the wolves. However,
the program leaves the holder of a grazing permit in a vulnerable position.
Ranches and grazing allotments in Western New Mexico and Eastern
Arizona cover vast amounts of land. The large size is necessary because
vegetation is sparse and large amounts of acreage are required to sustain
livestock. Moreover, the land's topography is somewhat mountainous.

Thus, even the most active rancher may go several days without seeing each
individual animal he has grazing the allotment.
The ultimate effect of FWS public land proposal is that a livestock
owner who is grazing animals on public land will rarely be able to protect
his animals from wolf attack. Assuming the released wolves will be as
averse to humans as FWS contends, the chances that a livestock owner will
catch a wolf actually attacking his livestock is minimal at best. This
aversiveness also makes it unlikely that he will ever have the opportunity
to chase the wolf away from his livestock. In any event, by the time a
livestock owner gets permission to "take" a wolf, the reintroduced predator
will have already killed his livestock. Thus, a constitutionally suspect action
will take place before the livestock owner is given a real, yet remote,
opportunity to protect his private property.
Many of the private ranches in the Blue Range area are mixed with
public grazing allotments. The typical ranch consists of a parcel of private
land which "anchors" a public grazing allotment. Thus, although operated
as single units, many ranches in the area are a mixture of private and public
land.
FWS has proposed separate rules for determining when offending
Mexican wolves may be "taken" or harassed on private land. On private
land, livestock owners may "harass wolves near livestock, people,
buildings, facilities, pets, or other domestic animals at any time."3'
Furthermore, a livestock owner may take wolves attacking livestock
regardless of the number of wolves in the area and the owner need not

34. See id.
35. See id. The program does not indicate how offending wolves will be identified when
more than one wolf is in the area. Therefore, one must wonder how FWS will determine
which wolf is the "offender' if there is a family group of several wolves present.
36. FISH & WILDLFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTrEORo, DRAFT ENvTL. IMPACT
STATFmmENT- REINroDucTioN OF THE MEXICAN WOLF WITHIN ITS HISTORIC RANGE IN THE
SOurHWESTERN UNITED STAS 2-21 (1995).

37. Id.
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allow government agencies the "first chance" to take the depredating
wolves. as "However, physical evidence that an attack occurred at the time
of the take must be present and the take must be promptly reported."39
On paper, these measures appear to protect livestock and wolf
alike. However, like the proposal for protecting livestock on public land, the
proposed safeguards for livestock producers are virtually worthless.
Generally, private and public lands in the reintroduction areas have the
same livestock carrying capacities. They also have similar topographies.
Thus, the odds of catching a wolf "attacking livestock" are poor. If a
livestock producer does not see the wolves, it logically follows that he
cannot scare them away from his cattle and cannot catch a wolf in the act of
attacking. Therefore, considering the realities of Western New Mexico /
Eastern Arizona ranching, FWS's proposed measures for protecting
livestock fail to accomplish their intended purpose.
E. What's for Dinner and Who's Buying?
FWS and livestock producers agree that Mexican wolves eat
livestock However, they cannot agree on how many domestic animals will
be killed by the reintroduced wolves. FWS predicts that the number of kills
will be relatively small. Livestock producers believe that the number of
depredations could rise far above FWS's estimates.
FWS's estimated livestock kills seem artificially low. The Blue
Range Recovery Area is home to approximately 82,000 head of cattle, 7,000
sheep, and a number of horses. Approximately 73,000 deer and elk also
inhabit the area. FWS predicts that wolves will kill between one and thirtyfour head of Blue Range cattle per year. ° However, the agency predicts that
deer and elk populations within the area will be affected by approximately
11,000 animals.' There are approximately 17,000 more cattle, sheep, and
horses in the Blue Range than deer and elk. Cattle and sheep are slower
than deer and elk and generally will not jump fences. Common sense
suggests that FWS's estimates of livestock kills are inaccurate.
Perhaps the reintroduction program's most significant shortcoming
is the absence of a method for compensating livestock owners when the
reintroduced wolves make a meal of livestock. FWS makes no effort to
explain why a compensation program is not part of its reintroduction
proposal. Perhaps the agency believes the program passes constitutional
muster without providing for compensation. Perhaps the agency believes

38.
39.
40.
41.

See id.
Id. at 2-21, 2-22.
See id. at 4-5.
See id. at 4-2.
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that the Defenders of Wildlife compensation program alleviates the need for
a government backed compensation program."' Regardless of its reasons,
the Fifth Amendment will likely compel FWS to pay for dinner.
PART II: PRIVATE PROPERTY, WOLF DEPREDATIONS AND THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT
The framers of the Constitution strongly supported private
property rights and believed that the government was morally obligated to
compensate property owners when it interfered with their private property
rights.'5 Those beliefs were formalized in the "Takings Clause" of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that the federal
government may not take private property for a public purpose unless the
government pays the property owner just compensation." Throughout
history, property owners have invoked the clause when government action
threatened to deprive them of their interest in private property. Today, the
clause continues "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole." 5
Generally, a taking can occur in two ways. First, a taking occurs
when the government deprives someone of his interest in private property
through some sort of acquisitive action. Second, a taking occurs when a
regulation limits a property owner's rights to the point that he is deprived
of his interest in the private property. Although the proposition appears
simple, "[t]he question of what constitutes a taking for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty."'
The "Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any set
formula for determining when justice and fairness require that economic

42. The Defenders of Wildlife currently operates a program which compensates
livestock producers for losses caused by protected predators. If Defenders of Wildlife
guaranteed compensation for all livestock lost to Mexican wolves, there would be little need
for FWS's plan to include a compensation procedure. Compensation under the privately
funded program, however, is not guaranteed. When disputes arise over the cause of
livestock deaths, the Defenders of Wildlife appears to err on the side of denying
compensation. See infra, note 130 and accompanying text. Moreover, although somewhat
outside the scope of this comment, the notion that a livestock owner whose private property
has been taken by government action must accept private compensation in lieu of seeking
compensation from the sovereign is, at best, a dubious proposition.
43. JoHN E.NowAx & ARTHuR R. MILL, CoNsOrNAL LAW § 11.12, at 438 (5th ed.

1995).
44. US. CoNSr. amend. V.
45. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles
California, 482 U.S. 304,318-19 (1987).
46. Penn Central TransportationCompany v. City of New York, 438 US. 104,123 (1978).
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injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons."47 Instead
of setting a formula for when compensation is required, the court examines
the taking question by engaging in an ad hoc factual inquiry considering:
1) the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner; 2) the
regulation's interference with the property owner's investment backed
expectations; and 3) the character of the governmental action.4 However,
the Court has described two "discrete" categories where it will award
compensation without engaging in a fact specific inquiry.49 First, if a
regulation authorizes physical invasion of private property, "no matter how
minute," there is a per se taking and compensation is due.' Second, if a
regulation denies all economically beneficial use of land, then there is a per
se taking.51
A.

Physical Invasions-Per Se Takings

The "physical invasion" rule for determining whether a taking has
occurred was introduced by the Supreme Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.. 2 In Loretto, a New York law authorized cable
companies to attach cable boxes and lines on privately owned apartment
buildings. The cable components occupied only 1.5 cubic feet of space on
Loretto's building. Adhering to the "historical rule that a permanent
physical occupation of another's property is a taking,"5 the court ordered
that the cable company pay just compensation.'
The "physical invasion" test has proven workable. The Federal
Circuit applied the test and found just compensation due in Hendler v.
United States.5 In Hendler, the EPA and the state of California were
monitoring a superfund site. Concerned that toxic waste was migrating and
might be contaminating a domestic and agricultural water source, the
agencies asked permission to place monitoring wells on Hendler's land.
Hendler declined their request. The EPA then issued an administrative
order granting itself and the state of California "access to plaintiffs'

47.
48.

Id. at. 124.
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).

49. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1015 (1992).
50. Id.
51. Id. "[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good.., he has suffered a taking.'
Id. at 1019.
52. See Loretto, 458 U.S. 419,421 (1982).
53. Id. at 435.
54. See id. at 441.
55. See Hendler,952 F.2d 1364,1375-78 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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property for, inter alia, 'locating, constructing, operating, maintaining, and
repairing monitor/extraction wells."'' Pursuant to the order, the EPA and
the state subsequently entered plaintiffs' land and drilled and operated 18
monitoring wells5 7 The Federal Circuit had no trouble finding that the
government's action amounted to a taking.,"
The United States Supreme Court will not conduct its usual "ad hoc
factual inquiry" when the government physically invades private property.
Instead, when a strand of a property owner's "bundle of sticks" has been
confiscated, a taking has occurred regardless of the public interest involved.
Unfortunately, litigating a case to the Supreme Court for a small damage
award on remand makes little financial sense and likely causes a number
of unconstitutional deprivations to go unprosecuted.5 9
B. Total Losses of Value- Per Se Talings
The Supreme Court introduced the "total loss" rule for finding a
taking in Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastalCouncil.' In Lucas, a South Carolina
law prevented a property owner from building homes on two beachfront
lots. Lucas filed suit against the state agency responsible for enforcing the
law alleging that he had been denied all "economically viable use" of his
property and therefore suffered a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. The state trial court found
that the ban on development rendered the property "valueless." Operating
on the trial court's finding, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Lucas and
held that when a property owner is denied all economically beneficial use
of his land, a taking has occurred.
Therefore, when a government action renders private property
valueless, a per se taking has occurred. As with a physical invasion, cases
involving total losses do not require the court to conduct its "ad hoc factual

56. See id. at 1369.
57. See id. at 1369-70.
58. See id. at 1378. The Court of Claims recently concluded the damages phase in the
Hendercase. 38 Fed. Cl. 611, 613 (Fed. Cl. 1997). The court concluded that although Hendler
indeed suffered a taking, the government's invasive action actually bestowed special
benefits on Hendler that outweighed any loss he incurred because of the government's
action. Id. Thus, after appearing four times before the Court of Claims and once before the
Federal Circuit, Hendler has proven to be little more than an academic exercise.
59. Of course, the government does not appeal every case awarding just compensation.
The case-specific nature of takings law, however, results in trial court decisions amenable
to appeal. Moreover, because broad interpretations awarding just compensation may place
a heavy burden on taxpayers, the government dearly has an interest in restrictively shaping
takings jurisprudence.
60. 505 U.S. 1003,1019.
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inquiry." Instead, the claim is immediately compensable on proving that the
loss was total and the government caused it.
C. Grizzly Bears and Wild Horses- Circuit Dealings With Talings by
Protected Wildlife
The federal courts have not decided whether a taking occurs when
federally protected, reintroduced predators kill privately owned livestock.
However, in Christy v. Hodel, the Ninth Circuit held that depredations by
federally protected (but not reintroduced) Grizzly bears did not rise to the
level of a compensable taking.6' In Christy, a rancher owned 1,700 sheep
which grazed on land leased from the Blackfoot Indian Tribe. Around July
1, 1982, Christy's herd became the subject of nightly attacks by Grizzly
bears. Christy's herder attempted, with limited success, to repel the bears
by building fires around the sheep and by shooting his gun in the air.
Christy even sought assistance from the FWS, who dispatched a trapper to
set snares for the bears. However, by July 9 the bears had killed
approximately twenty of Christy's sheep, resulting in a financial loss of at
least $1,200.
On the evening of July 9,1982, Christy and the government trapper
were with the herd when two Grizzlies entered the clearing. One bear
quickly retreated into the forest. The remaining bear moved toward the
herd. When the bear came within approximately sixty yards of the herd,
Christy shot and killed it. For the next several weeks, the trapper
unsuccessfully attempted to catch the offending bears. On July 24, Christy
removed his sheep from the land. During the twenty-four day period, he
lost a total of 84 sheep to the protected bears. He was also fined $3,000 by
FWS for killing a federally protected Grizzly bear.
Joined by two similarly situated landowners, Christy filed suit in
the United States District Court for the District of Montana. In his
complaint, Christy sought a permanent injunction restraining FWS from
enforcing the Endangered Species Act and Grizzly bear regulations against
him. He claimed that the regulations deprived him of his fundamental right
to possess and protect his property, deprived him of his property without
just compensation, and deprived him of equal protection of the laws. The
district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment and
Christy appealed.
On appeal, Christy argued that the bears were "governmental
agents" which had physically appropriated his sheep. The Ninth Circuit
refused to analyze the case under a "physical invasion" analysis. Instead,

61. See Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324,1335 (9th Cir. 1988).
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the court purported to analyze whether the Endangered Species Act and the
Grizzly bear regulations effected a regulatory taking on Christy.62
Before reaching its ultimate conclusion, the court presented a
lengthy discussion of "pertinent" cases that primarily concern damage done
to land by protected wildlife. 3 Interestingly, the "pertinent" cases the court
discussed were largely inapposite to the issue before it. Christy suffered a
complete loss each time a bear killed one of his sheep. The court's discussion
focused on cases where the value of property was diminishe, not destroyed.
Arguably, the cases support the court's determination that the bear's
conduct was not attributable to the government. The diminutions of value
cases, however, do not support the proposition that federally-protected
wildlife can destroy private property without the federal government being
financially responsible. Thus, any such reliance on the cases was
inappropriate.
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit's decision turned on the court's
determination that the bear's conduct was not attributable to the
government. Relying primarily on a portion of Douglas v. Seacoast Products,
Inc.," the court stated that "[the federal government does not own the wild
animals it protects, nor does the government control the conduct of such
animals."' "It is pure fantasy to talk of 'owning' wild fish, birds or animals.
Neither the States nor the Federal Government ...has title to these creatures
until they are reduced to skillful capture."' Noting that the government did
not reintroduce the bears to the area, the court refused to attribute the bears'
conduct to the federal government.67 The court did not, however, foreclose
such an argument. Indeed, it explicitly reserved judgment on the question
of whether destruction of private property by federally protected
reintroduced predators amounted to a taking.'M
A fair reading of Christy suggests that the Ninth Circuit panel was
concerned with the lack of physical control the government had over the
Grizzly bears. Although the issue was not before them, footnote nine of the
opinion gives the impression that the panel may have attributed the bears'

62. Although the court claimed to analyze the case under a regulatory takings
framework, the court's analysis as a whole, indicates the court actually analyzed the case
under a traditional physical invasion analysis. See id. at 1334-35.
63. See id.
64. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
65. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1335 (9th Cir. 1988).
66. Id. (quoting Douglas,431 U.S. at 284).
67. See id.
68. "Whether the government may be held responsible for damage caused by bears or
other wild animals that have been relocated by the government, under a theory that such
animals are instrumentalities of the government, is a question we do not decide." Id. at 1335
n.9.
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conduct to the government if the government had reintroduced the bears
into the area. Considering the pervasive control FWS intends to exercise
over the reintroduced wolves, a panel following the same logic as the
Christy court may very well link depredations by Mexican wolves to the
federal government.
Approximately three years before the Ninth Circuit decided Christy,
the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that damage to private grazing land
by federally protected wild horses did not amount to a compensable taking
in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel." In Mountain States, horses
protected under the Wild Free Roaming Horses and Burros Act7" entered
the plaintiff's private grazing land, causing damage to forage and
consuming significant amounts of plaintiffs privately owned forage and
water. The Horse and Burro Act, however, prevented the plaintiff from
chasing the horses off of the land. The plaintiff requested that the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM), the agency charged with overseeing the Act,
remove the animals from its private land. The BLM disregarded the
plaintiff's initial requests. By the time the horses were removed, they had
done significant damage to plaintiff's private grazing land.
Mountain States was before the Tenth Circuit on two occasions.
Originally, a three-judge panel consisting of Judges Seth, Barrett and McKay
held that the plaintiff was the victim of a taking; McKay dissented.7 In the
majority's view, the Horse and Burro Act created a level of control in the
federal government that was more pervasive than other wildlife protection
acts. The majority seemingly recognized that by taking away the citizen's
ability to protect their property and delegating it to the BLM, the Horse and
Burro Act created control that was so pervasive that the government was
actually responsible for damage caused by the horses. Thus, the panel
linked the horses' conduct to the BLM and ruled that a taking had occurred.
On rehearing en banc, a majority of the court held that no
compensable taking had occurred.' The majority concluded that the
government's control over the horses was no different from that of other
69. 799 F.2d 1423,1431 (10th Cir. 1986) (Seth, J., Holloway, J., and Barrett, J., dissenting)
(Mountain States II).
70. The plaintiffs in both Mountain States and Christy applied pertinent regulations in
a way similar to the Supreme Court in Loretto. In Loretto, the statute allowing the cable
company to place its cable box on the apartment building made the government responsible
for the invasion of the plaintiff's property. In Christy, the plaintiff argued that the statute
created a relationship between the bears and government that made the government
responsible for the bears' actions. In Mountain States, the plaintiff and dissenting judges
argued that the Wild Horse and Burro Act created a relationship between the BLM and the
wild horses by which the BLM was responsible for the horses actions
71. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Clark, 740 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter
Mountain States I].
72. Mountain States II, 799 F.2d at 1431.
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wildlife, and that it was therefore not responsible for the horses' conduct.
Citing a string of cases holding that diminution of value did not rise to the
level of a taking, the court reasoned that because the plaintiffs had not
suffered a complete loss, but had only suffered a diminution in the value of
their land, no taking had occurred.' Importantly, the majority did not hold
that "pervasive control" was irrelevant. Rather, it held that pervasive
control was not present in the case.
Although ultimately overturned, Judge Seth got it right the first
time. Judge Seth recognized that when the government chooses to
pervasively manage the conduct of wild animals and the citizens affected
by them, at some point, it becomes responsible for damages flowing from
its regulations. The Horse and Burro Act was purposefully designed to give
the BLM exclusive management authority over the wild horses. Indeed, the
act placed the horses "in a newly created legal category not wild animals,
not estrays, not migratory, not related to treaty obligations but as part of the
public lands ... ."' Once Congress designated the horses components of the
public lands, control over the animals' actions rested exclusively with the
BLM; private landowners lost any ability to manage them. Thus, Judge Seth
correctly concluded that because the wild horses were managed more
pervasively than other protected wildlife, their actions were attributable to
the federal government.
Read together, Christy and Mountain States provide a picture of
when a property owner may receive compensation for property "taken" by
protected wildlife. Christy lacked pervasive government control. The Ninth
Circuit panel needed the government to exercise more control over the
bears before they would hold the government liable for damage caused by
the bears. Mountain States lacked a complete loss. The majority in Mountain
States needed a complete loss (and pervasive control) before they would
find a taking. Thus, the cases suggest that when the government has
pervasive control over depredating wildlife and the property owner suffers
a complete loss, a compensable taking has occurred.
D. Applying Per Se Takings Analysis to "Takings" Perpetrated by
Mexican Wolves
The key factor for finding a taking when a Mexican wolf kills
privately owned livestock is linking the wolf's conduct to the federal
government. Although this may ultimately prove difficult, the Supreme
Court and Western Circuits have mapped the course. The Ninth Circuit
rejected the idea that the federal government "owned" or controlled the

73.
74.

Id. at 1430.
Id. at 1435.
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conduct of protected Grizzly bears. However, the Supreme Court's decision
in Douglas v. Seacoast Productsindicates that a situation could arise where
the government can be held responsible for the actions of protected wildlife.
In Douglas, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is pure fantasy to talk of
owning wild fish, birds or animals. Neither the States nor the Federal
Government ...
has title to these creatures until they are reduced to
possession by skillful capture."' Taken to its logical end, Douglasstands for
the proposition that once the government has captured wild animals and
exerted a certain amount of control over them, it "owns" them.
Every Mexican wolf slated for release was raised in captivity. Thus,
the FWS has gone past the point of skillful capture and has actually raised
the wolves. Furthermore, once released, the agency is not going to
relinquish control of the wolves. The Draft EIS proposes comprehensive
measures to control the wolves' behavior and to keep them within the
confines of the reintroduction area. The conceptual link between the federal
government and the reintroduced wolves is apparent in light of Douglas.
Furthermore, the measures proposed by FWS make the agency's control
over the reintroduced wolves different from its control over other protected
wildlife. Therefore, Christy and Mountain States support the link between the
wolves and the federal government as well.76
After this initial determination, the courts should have no trouble
finding a compensable taking when a Mexican wolf depredates privately
owned livestock under a Loretto physical invasion analysis, particularly if
the depredation occurs on public land. The proposed rule requires a
livestock owner to watch his animals fall prey to the wolves if the attack
occurs on public land. Once a wolf has killed a sheep or cow, the animal is
valueless. The "bundle of sticks" in livestock includes the right to a live
animal." Accordingly, private property has been taken for a public purpose
and just compensation is due.

75.

Douglas,431 U.S. 265,284 (1977).

76. Notably, the California Court of Appeals has adopted a position regarding the
control and ownership of reintroduced elk that appears to be at odds with a logical reading
of Douglas and my position that the reintroduction program places the government in a
position of responsibility over the reintroduced Mexican wolves. See Moerman v. State, 21
Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). In Moerman, the California Department of Fish and

Game reintroduced a number of tule elk near Moerman's ranch. That winter, the
reintroduced elk damaged Moerman's fences and consumed crops he raised to feed
livestock. Moerman, alleging that the state was responsible for the elk's actions, filed suit

seeking $94,000 in damages from the state of California. Concluding that the elk were not
"instrumentalities of...nor...controlled by the state," the Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the state. Id. at 334.
77. Certainly, under state tort laws, if a private party releases a wolf that subsequently
kills a neighbor's cow, that party is liable.
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E. Regulatory Takings
Generally, a regulatory taking likely occurs when "a regulatory or
administrative action places such burdens on the ownership of private
property that essential elements of such ownership must be viewed as
having been taken, even if the regulatory or administrative action has not
deprived the owner of title or possession."'7 When a regulation deprives
someone of an essential element of private property, courts embark on a
three-factor analysis to determine if just compensation is due pursuant to
the Fifth Amendment. The three factors considered by the courts are: 1) the
character of the government action; 2) the economic impact of the
government action; and 3) the extent to which the government action
interferes with plaintiff's distinct investment-backed expectations."
The character of government action element focuses on the property
interest affected by the agency action. The inquiry examines the plaintiff's
property interest under state law and the government's ability to regulate
that interest.8" For example, if a property owner is using his property for a
noxious purpose, the state may, under its police power, regulate the
property and prevent the noxious use. The plaintiff is not entitled to
compensation because he never had the right to use his property for
noxious purposes. However, if a property owner is using his property in a
way protected by state property law, and the state regulates it, the property
owner is entitled to just compensation if the other elements are met.
The second element examines the economic impact of the regulation
on the property owner. This inquiry focuses primarily on the seriousness of
the financial imposition the agency action forces the property owner to
bear.' This economic impact "is measured by comparing the fair market
value of the property before and after the alleged date of the taking."' If the
agency action causes the plaintiffs to suffer a "serious financial loss," this
element is satisfied. s3
The third element of the Penn Centraltest requires a determination
of whether the regulation or agency action interfered with the property
owner's investment backed expectations. This criterion limits recoveries to
plaintiffs who can demonstrate that they "bought their property in reliance

78. Hendler v. United States, 36 Fed. CI. 574, 585 (Fed. Cl. 1996).
79. Penn Central Transportation Co. v City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978).
80. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1028 (1992).
81. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171,1177 (Fed Cir. 1994).
82. Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. United States, 35 Fed. CL. 615,619 (Fed. CI. 1996).
83. Id. This appears to be a question of fact, which the Court of Claims judges are
applying on a case by case basis. There seems to be no threshold standard for what is a
.serious financial loss.' See, e.g., id. at 618-19; Eastern Minerals Int'l, Inc. v. United States,
36 Fed. CI. 541, 549-50 (Fed. C. 1996).
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on a state of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory regime.""
This showing prevents plaintiffs who knew of the regulatory scheme prior
to purchasing their property from receiving just compensation for the
property.' A plaintiff who purchased with knowledge of the regulatory
scheme would receive a windfall if just compensation were paid because
the market had already discounted the property before he purchased it. 6
Under this framework, depredations by reintroduced Mexican
wolves seem to result in a regulatory taking. Livestock owners have a
protected interest in their livestock. Of course, the interest is subject to the
state's police power. So, if a livestock owner's cattle became infected with
a disease that threatened the entire area's herds, the state could likely order
his cattle destroyed without paying just compensation. However, if a
livestock owner is lawfully grazing his cattle, and the government orders
him to provide three cows per year to feed homeless people, then
compensation would be due. In that situation, the livestock owner has a
protected interest in his cattle which the government cannot effectively
confiscate without compensation.
The Mexican wolf program creates a situation analogous to the
examples above. Livestock owners in the reintroduction program will likely
be grazing their cattle lawfully. On public and private land, the livestock
owners have a protected state property interest in their live animals.
Undoubtedly, the owner's "bundle of sticks' includes the right to exclude
others from their livestock.' Thus, when a Mexican wolf kills and eats a
cow, sheep, or horse it has appropriated the most essential "stick" for a
public purpose. The taking of such a stick satisfies the first element of the
Penn Central test.
The Wolf program also appears to violate the second prong of the
Penn Central test. When a Mexican wolf kills livestock, he forces the
livestock owner to suffer a "serious financial loss." The value of a live cow
can range from approximately $400 to $1500, pre-taking. The value of a
dead cow is $0, post-taking. In fact, a livestock producer may incur
expenses in removing the dead animal. The economic impact of an agency
action is measured by subtracting the value after the taking from the value
before the taking ' When a Mexican wolf kills a cow, there is a 100 percent
loss. Accordingly, the second element is satisfied.
The third element, interference with the property owner's
investment-backed expectations, also appears to be satisfied in relation to

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Bass, 35 Fed. Cl. at 620 (quoting Loveladies Harbor,28 F.3d at 1177).
Id.
See Loveladies Harbor,28 F.3d at 1177.
Indeed, "cattle rustling" appears to remain a crime in all fifty states.
Bass, 35 Fed. C. at 619.
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the Wolf Program. Livestock owners invest money in brood stock so that
they can make a profit. The current regulatory scheme gives them an
expectancy interest in live animals. Therefore, if a livestock owner
purchases livestock prior to the final reintroduction rule, he has relied "on
a state of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory regime." "
Thus, any depredation of his livestock by the reintroduced wolves interferes
with his investment-backed expectation.
Although this element is likely satisfied, the interference with
investment backed expectations prong presents the most difficult portion
of a plaintiff's case where a wolf depredates livestock. In Lucas v. South
Carolina CoastalCouncil, Justice Scalia opined that "in the case of personal
property, by reason of the state's traditionally high degree of control over
commercial dealings [a citizen] ought to be aware of the possibility that the
new regulation might even render his property economically worthless (at
least if the property's only economically productive use is sale or
manufacture)." 90This statement by Justice Scalia suggests that a livestock
producer is fighting an uphill battle when attempting to prove that the Wolf
Program has interfered with his investment backed expectations.
Justice Scalia's statement is not the holding of Lucas. Indeed, Justice
Scalia's extremely broad statement addressed an issue not before the court.
Moreover, the discussion following the pronouncement narrows it
considerably. For example, Justice Scalia's citation to Andrus v. Allard"
suggests that the statement only applies if the regulation is directly aimed
at a certain type of property. In Andrus, Congress passed a law banning the
sale of eagle feathers. The plaintiffs owned a number of artifacts made with
eagle feathers. They owned the eagle feathers before the law made it illegal
to sell them. After the law was passed, they sold some artifacts that
contained feathers. The plaintiffs were then prosecuted for violating the
law. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the law prohibiting the sale of
eagle feathers took their property without just compensation. The Supreme
Court disagreed and held that no compensable taking had occurred.'
By its own language, Andrus is a very limited opinion. After
announcing that no compensation would be awarded, the court explained
the limits to its holding. The Court pointed out that "[t]he regulations ... do
not compel the surrender of the artifacts, and there is no physical invasion
or restraint upon them." Instead, the regulations merely imposed a
restriction on how the artifacts could be disposed. The Court recognized

89. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171,1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

90.

505 U.S. 1003,1027 (1992).

91.

Id. at 1028 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979)).

92. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67-68 (1979).
93.

Id. at 65.
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that the regulation took away the most profitable use of the feathers, but did
not take away all economic uses. "[F or example, they might exhibit the
artifacts for an admission charge." " The Court further limited its holding:
"[i]n this case, it is crucial that appellees retain the rights to possess and
transport their property, and to donate or devise the protected birds." The
Court ultimately held that "the simple prohibition of the sale of lawfully
acquired property in this case does not effect a taking in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.""
Justice Scalia's statement, made in reliance on Andrus, is
inapplicable to Mexican wolf depredations. I First, the types of regulations
at which Justice Scalia's statement is aimed are attempts to directly regulate
certain conduct. In Andrus, that conduct was the sale of eagle feathers. The
Mexican wolf program does not attempt to prohibit livestock production.
Secondly, once livestock is killed and eaten by a Mexican wolf, the property
owner is left with nothing of value. He cannot sell the animal, and it is
highly unlikely that people would pay admission to see the dead animal.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Andrus, a livestock producer has a total loss and not
merely a diminution in the value of his property.
Depredations by Mexican wolves appear to fit neatly within the
academic confines of takings law. Unfortunately, a takings suit over the loss
of one cow or fifty cows for that matter is not practical. Loretto is a prime
example. The case has an extensive history and the damage award received
by the plaintiff did not justify her efforts. Likewise, litigating the loss of a
cow to the Supreme Court is an unsatisfactory solution to the problems
created by the reintroduction. The ultimate effect of the proposed program
is that FWS may infringe on the citizen's constitutional rights, with no
redress available to the citizen.

94.

Id. at 66.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 67-68.
97. Mugler v.Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), is not at odds with this result. In Mugler,
prohibition made the sale of alcoholic beverages illegal. Mugler had invested in facilities
used to produce alcoholic beverages. When Congress outlawed the sale of alcohol Mugler
sued, claiming that the law worked a taking on his property. The Supreme Court denied his
argument. The prohibition law was aimed at preventing citizens like Mugler from using
their property to produce alcohol. Thus, the regulation he complained of was passed to
prevent the exact conduct in which he was engaging. Moreover, nothing in the legislation
prevented him from using his property in another manner. The Court's reasoning is largely
in line with Andrus.
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Part III: Mexican Wolves, Federal Officials, and the Lesson of Webster
Bivens
Government officials in the United States are on the job 365 days
per year assuring that the laws of the United States are upheld. Not
surprisingly, federal agents sometimes overstep their authority and violate
citizens' constitutional rights. A police officer acting under color of
authority may exceed the strictures of his search warrant in violation of the
victim's fourth amendment right to be free from unlawful searches and
seizures. A customs agent may fail to perform his duties in a diligent
manner and thereby violate a citizen's right to due process under the Fifth
Amendment. A forest service agent may destroy a citizen's property
without providing the citizen notice, thus depriving the citizen of property
without just compensation. Similarly, a Fish and Wildlife Service agent may
violate a citizen's constitutional rights if he fails to recover a Mexican wolf
that strays onto private property and subsequently kills and eats a citizen's
livestock.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a citizen may sue a state officer for damages
if that officer oversteps his authority and violates the citizen's civil rights.
However, no federal statute provides a method for compensating a citizen
when a federal agent, acting under color of authority, violates the citizen's
civil rights. In fact, before 1971, if a federal agent violated a citizen's
constitutional rights while acting under the color of federal authority, the
citizen had no federal alternative but to accept the deprivation. Then, in
1971, the Supreme Court held that when a federal agent acting under color
of his authority violates a citizen's constitutional rights, such unconstitutional conduct gives rise to a cause of action for damages against the agent."
A. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named FederalAgents: The "Constitutional
Tort" Emerges
Webster Bivens was sitting at home with his family when six agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered and arrested him. The agents
"manacled [him] in front of his wife and children, and threatened to arrest
the entire family."" "They searched the apartment from stem to stem. "
The agents then took Mr. Bivens to a federal courthouse where he was
booked, interrogated, and subjected to a visual strip search.

98. Bivens v. Six UnknownNamed Federal Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388,389 (1971).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Unhappy (to put it mildly) with his treatment, Bivens filed suit in
federal district court alleging that the officers had violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.'01 Mr. Bivens sought $15,000 in damages from each
officer as his remedy." Unwilling to imply a damages action based upon
a violation of the Constitution, the district court dismissed his lawsuit for
failure to state a claim." Following basically the same course as the district
court, the Second Circuit affirmed' Realizing the importance of the claim,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari1 3 and reversed."
In finding that Mr. Bivens could directly sue for damages under the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court relied largely on the status of the
defendants as Federal Officers. The Court noted the special relationship
between citizens and federal agents. The Court explained that "power
[granted to federal agents] ... does not disappear like a magic gift when it
is wrongfully used. An agent acting-albeit unconstitutionally-in the
name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an
107
individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own."
Accordingly, the Justices rejected the officers' argument that Mr. Bivens
should have to sue them as citizens under state tort law. Instead, the Court
exercised its power to "use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done.""° The court determined that damages were an appropriate
remedy,"' and that Bivens was entitled to recover monetary damages "for
any injuries he... suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the [Fourth]
Amendment.""1 Thus, Bivens was given his day in court and the
"Constitutional Tort"" entered the arena of American jurisprudence.

101. Id.
102. Id. at 389-90.
103. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 276
F. Supp. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
104. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 409
F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969).
105. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 399
U.S. 905 (1970).
106. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390.
107. Id. at 392.
108. Id. at 396.
109. "That damages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of the
Fourth Amendment should hardly seem a surprising proposition. Historically, damages
have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty."
Id. at 395.
110. Id. at 397.
111. The term "Constitutional Tort" apparently comes from the Supreme Court's
decision in Monroe v. Pape.See Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens ConstitutionalTort: An Unfulfilled
Promise,67 N.C. L. REV. 337 (1989).
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B. Actions Against Federal Agents Under Bivens
In order to prevail in a Bivens action, a plaintiff must prove that the
federal agent acting under color of authority deprived him of a dearly
established right guaranteed by the Constitution. Although this analysis
seems simple, the requirements of a Bivens suit are, in reality, quite
complex. For example, what is a clearly established constitutional right?
When is a federal agent acting under color of authority?
Moreover, a Bivens defendant may raise several defenses that will
prevent a plaintiff from recovering even if he actually violated the plaintiff's
constitutional rights. First, if the offending government agent "reasonably
believed he was acting properly in light of clearly established principles of
law," he is immune from suit under a qualified privilege. The test for
establishing qualified privilege is objective, the agent's subjective intent is
irrelevant. The agent can knowingly and purposefully violate someone's
constitutional rights; but if a reasonable agent would have thought the
conduct to be lawful, the offending agent is immune from suit.'1 As for the
"clearly established law" portion of the qualified immunity test, "so long as
there is a 'legitimate question' about the constitutionality of the official's
conduct, it cannot be said that such conduct.., violates clearly established
law."
Determining when conduct violates clearly established laws
requires a fact intensive inquiry. However, courts seem inclined to find that
conduct violates clearly established laws when officers' actions infringe
upon rights protected under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eight
Amendments.
Second, a Bivens defendant may escape liability for violating a
citizen's constitutional rights if "special factors counsel hesitation" exist that
counsel against in implying a cause of action based on the Constitution. 1'
Supreme Court jurisprudence is not exactly illuminating as to what
constitutes a "special factor counseling hesitation." However, a fair reading
of the cases suggests that suits arising out of military service or government
employment are especially susceptible to a finding of a special factor."
Furthermore, where Congress has paid special attention to an area and
provided special remedial schemes, the courts will likely find a "special
factor counseling hesitation."1 6

112. John E. Nordin, The Constitutiona/LiabilityofFederalEmployees: Bivens Claim4,41 FED
B. NESs
113.
114.
115.
116.

& J. 342,346 (1994).
Id. (quoting Mitchellv. Forsythe, 472 US. 511, 535 n.12 (1985)).
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,245 (1979).
See Chappel v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 2% (1983); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 US. 412(1988).
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Finally, if Congress has "provided an alternative remedy that it
explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the
Constitution and viewed as equally effective," a Bivens action will not lie.
In determining whether the alternative remedy is equally effective, the
court may consider, inter alia, whether the alternative remedy provides a
right to a jury trial and the deterrent effect on the offending officer. A Ninth
Circuit panel found a takings action under the Tucker Act to be an inferior
alternative to a Bivens action against the offending federal agent." 7
C. Bivens Actions When Federal Officials Fail to Control Mexican
Wolves Under Their "Supervision"
The idea that a federal official charged with "supervising" wild
animals may properly be the subject of a Bivens action is not novel. In
Mountain States Legal Foundationv. Hodel, the plaintiffs apparently advanced
the theory against the BLM... Neither the original nor the en banc opinions
clearly addressed the issue. However, Judge Seth briefly mentioned it in his
dissent to the en banc opinion."9 The plaintiffs theorized that the BLM was
responsible for the continued trespass on their private land by the wild
horses. The plaintiffs informed the appropriate BLM authority that the
horses were trespassing. The BLM officer knew the horses were eating
plaintiffs' forage, drinking plaintiffs' stock water, and damaging plaintiffs'
land. The BLM officer neglected his duty to promptly remove the horses
from plaintiffs' land. Thus, the BLM officer's inaction deprived plaintiffs of
their property without due process of law and a Bivens action was in order.
In his brief discussion, Judge Seth appeared unwilling to extend
Bivens to a "complete failure to act."' 2° However, Bivens jurisprudence
clearly permits Bivens actions based on omissions. 121For example, in Seguin
v. Eide, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Bivens liability where a customs agent
failed to take prompt action regarding a seized automobile!' Also, in Estelle
v.Gamble, the Supreme Court recognized a Bivens action based on a federal

117. Weiss v. Lehman, 642 F.2d 265,267-68 (9th Cir. 1981) vacated & remanded454 U.S. 807
(1981). Although vacated, the Supreme Court's remand order and the panel opinion on
remand did not appear to attack this finding. See id.
(remand order); Weiss v. Lehman, 676
F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982) (decision on remand).
118. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423,1434 (10th Cir. 1986) (Seth,
J., dissenting).
119. Id at 1434-35.
120. Id. at 1434.
121. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Seguin v. Eide, 645 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1981)
vacated & remanded462 US. 1101 (1981) on remand720 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1984) (same result
as original decision).
122. Seguin, 645 F.2d at 811.
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official's failure to provide a prisoner with medical care." A fair reading of
these cases clearly establishes that a Bivens action may arise from a federal
agent's omissions as well as direct actions."
A Bivens action would probably arise in regards to Mexican wolf
depredation in the following situation. FWS's proposed rule places a duty
on the agency to remove the wolf if the landowner so requests. A wolf
roams onto private land where cattle graze. The landowner requests that
FWS remove the wolf. The owner notifies the agency that cattle are present.
The agent responsible for removing the wolf does not diligently and
promptly remove the wolf. The wolf kills livestock owned by the
landowner.
This situation appears to be a picture perfect scenario for a Bivens
claim. The agent is acting (failing to act in this situation) under color of
authority. Under the proposed rule, FWS agents are vested with federal
authority to remove the wolf. In fact, the proposed rule goes one step
further and places agents under a duty to remove the wolf. There should
not be any qualified immunity because the agent knows that the wolf is in
the vicinity of livestock and that wolves kill livestock. Moreover, a
reasonable agent would know that the livestock owner has a property
interest in the livestock.
There is no alternative remedy that will prevent a Bivens action in
this hypothetical. Neither Congress nor the FWS have created an
administrative process for compensating livestock owners for depredations.
Perhaps there is an action under the Tucker Act and the Fifth Amendment.
However, a court will likely find such an action inadequate when compared
to the Bivens action.
Finally, there appears to be no insurmountable "special factor
counseling hesitation" of allowing a Bivens action in this case. The
proposed reintroduction plan creates pervasive control by the FWS.
Congress has not chosen to become directly involved with the
reintroduction program, and the claim is not arising out of military or other
federal employment. Certainly, neither Congress nor FWS has provided a
comprehensive remedial scheme for implementing the program. In fact, the
absence of such a scheme suggests that Congress is not taking an
adequately active role in the reintroduction to create a "special factor
counseling hesitation." Therefore, a Bivens action arising out of the above

123. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97.
124. Certainly, Judge Seth did not view this claim as meritless. Indeed, he proposed that
the claim should be remanded to the trial court for additional fact-finding on the Bivens
issue. Mountain States 11, 799 F.2d at 1435. Moreover, he described the claim as having "much
appeal under these circumstances where its elements seem to be admitted by the officials
and the other facts supporting it are not challenged." Id. at 1434.
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factual scenario should not be vulnerable to an adverse summary judgment
decision based on this factor.
The hypothetical scenario described above is, of course, designed
to fit a Bivens analysis. However, it took little imagination to create. FWS
provided the framework. The way the reintroduction program is set up, the
FWS places a burden on its agents that is likely to place their duties in direct
conflict with the livestock owner's constitutional rights." s In reality, it is
quite possible that a situation substantially similar to the one outlined above
could occur now that the wolves have been released."
Although Bivens has academic appeal in this scenario, like a takings
case, a Bivens action simply makes no sense when the loss suffered is
between $500 and $1,500. Weiss v. Lehman is a prime example. In that case,
a forest service agent destroyed some property located on an old mining
claim. The owner of the property sued the forest service agent under Bivens.
The case survived summary judgment and a jury awarded the plaintiff
$1000 in damages against the agent."z The agent, represented free of charge
by the Justice Department, appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed" and the agent appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court for review in light of a recently decided Supreme Court case vacated
the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case.1" On remand, the
Ninth Circuit decided that the record needed further developing and
remanded the case to the trial court.130

125. FWS's proposed reintroduction program appears to overstate the agency's abilities
to control the released wolves. As the Draft EIS acknowledges, wolves do not adhere to
arbitrary boundaries drawn on paper. The agency's representations would seemingly
require around the clock monitoring of the wolves.
126. This analysis is merely intended to show that a Mexican wolf depredation could
possibly fit within the academic framework of Biens. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Federal Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969). On a day to day
basis, courts are quite reluctant to let plaintiffs proceed with Bivens suits. To put the
numbers into perspective, I include the following excerpt:
While federal officials have been inundated in Bivens lawsuits, adverse
judgments have not been a problem. Of the some 12,000 Bivens suits filed,
only thirty have resulted in judgments on behalf of the plaintiffs. Of these,
a number have been reversed on appeal and only four judgments have
actually been paid by the federal defendants. Moreover, very few Bivens
cases have settled with any money paid to the plaintiff.
Rosen, supra note 109, at 343.
127. Weiss v. Lehman, 642 F.2d 265,266 (9th Cir. 1981).

128. Id.
129. Lehman v. Weiss, 454 U.S. 807 (1981).
130. Weiss v. Lehman, 676 F.2d 1320,1323 (9th Cir. 1982).
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The history of Weiss is outrageous and is not isolated.1 3 The
plaintiff likely spent over $1000 in legal fees before he ever stepped into the
courtroom. Moreover, the taxpayer's cost to litigate the case was likely
exorbitant. Two appearances before the trial court, two appearances before
the Ninth Circuit, and one appearance before the Supreme Court - all over
a claim of $1000. Weiss is a perfect example of why an administrative
procedure for compensating livestock owners for animals killed by
reintroduced Mexican wolves is necessary. When the government infringes
upon citizen's rights, the citizen should not have to spend $100,000
litigating the issue, particularly when his out of pocket losses are
considerably smaller than his legal fees. Furthermore, several years of
litigation over claims worth a few hundred dollars is a tragic waste of the
taxpayers' dollar.
PART IV: PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR COMPENSATION
FWS's Draft EIS expressly states that the agency will not compensate livestock owners for depredations by reintroduced Mexican wolves.
This decision is made in light of the agency's suspicious prediction that only
1-34 head of cattle will be killed each year by the wolves. The agency's logic
is puzzling. If its predictions on livestock losses is correct, the total cost of
a compensation program is minute when compared to programs annual $6
million budget. Thus, one must wonder why FWS has not included a
compensation program in its reintroduction proposal.
One explanation for the conspicuous absence of a compensation
program may be the availability of private funding. The Defenders of
Wildlife has offered to compensate livestock owners for any losses caused
by the reintroduced Mexican wolves. Payment by Defenders, however, is
not guaranteed. An Idaho rancher recently lost a calf to a reintroduced
Rocky Mountain Gray wolf. A local veterinarian and a FWS employee
agreed that the wolf killed the calf. However, a FWS autopsy determined
that the calf was stillborn and that the wolf was just eating the dead carcass.
The autopsy also turned up a bone from another calf in the wolf's stomach,

131. In Seguin v. Eide, 645 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1981), a plaintiff won a jury award of around
$7300 against a customs agent in a Bivens suit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the liability under
Bivens, but reversed and remanded the damage award because the jury improperly awarded
damages for emotional distress. The customs agent, represented free of cost by the Justice
Department, appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for
consideration in light of one of its recent cases. On remand, the Ninth Circuit reached the
same result and remanded the case for re-determination of damages. $7300 is substantially
more money than $1000. However, this much litigation over $7300 is ridiculous. These two
cases are perfect examples of why Bivens actions are not tenable in the case of livestock
depredations by Mexican wolves.
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which indicated that he had eaten at least one other calf. The Defenders of
Wildlife refused to compensate the livestock producer because of the
autopsy findings. This decision on the part of the Defenders of Wildlife
indicates that when the livestock producer and FWS disagree over the cause
of an animal's death, Defenders will give the wolf the benefit of the doubt
and refuse compensation. 3 2
The following administrative procedure for compensating livestock
owners for depredations is fair, simple, and efficient. The first step is the
livestock producer's prompt report of the depredation to FWS. The producer must then permit FWS access to the carcass and scene of attack. FWS
agents then prepare a report of the scene and state their conclusion as to
whether the depredation is attributable to the wolves. If the agents conclude
that the wolf is responsible, then the FWS pays the livestock owner market
value for his loss. For calves, lambs, or colts, the market value should be
calculated on the animal's prospective value at shipping time.l1 For mature
animals, the market value would be the value of the animal at the time of
death. For example, if a pregnant cow is killed, compensation should be
based on the value of a pregnant cow. Conversely, if a cow is not pregnant,
compensation should be based on the value of an open cow.'
If the FWS agent disagrees with the livestock owner over whether
or not the animal was killed by a wolf, the agent should immediately notify
the livestock owner that the FWS will contest liability. This will allow the
livestock owner to obtain an independent expert to evaluate the claim at his
own expense. Both the agent and the expert should complete detailed
reports of what caused the animal's death. If the FWS deems necessary, the
agency may also have an additional expert examine the dead animal."n The
agent and expert reports should contain all of the information relied upon

132. FWS eventually paid off in this case. After a lawsuit was filed on behalf of the
livestock owner by Mountain States Legal Foundation, a high level official in the Department
of Justice approved a $400 payment to compensate the owner for his calf.
133. Damages should be awarded in this manner to put the livestock owner in the
position he would have occupied had the wolf not killed his calf. Deciding what amount will
restore the status quo may ultimately prove difficult. At first, logic dictates that the rancher
be compensated for the value of the calf on the date of its death. Such an approach would
not be consistent with ranching practices, however. Typically, a livestock producer cannot
simply purchase another two-day-old calf from a livestock auction and force the dead calf's
mother to adopt it. Indeed, the mother may refuse to adopt the calf or the young orphan may
not survive the stressful trip to the ranch. Furthermore, the livestock owner will likely
receive the compensation in a matter of months, not days. Therefore, the best approach for
valuing the animal is to fix the value at the date its siblings are shipped, not from the date
of death.
134. An open cow is a cow that is not pregnant.
135. It is likely that local FWS offices will have personnel capable of determining an
animal's cause of death.
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by the person completing the report. The next step would be to file a claim
with an administrative law judge ("ALJ").
The ALJ should be given a strict set of criteria for evaluating the
claim. In addition, the ALJ should decide the claim based on the parties'
reports in order to keep litigation costs down. However, if the ALJ
determines that a full evidentiary hearing is necessary, he should retain the
discretion to order one. The standard appeal process would be available
once the ALJ renders his decision.
This proposal may seem deceivingly simple. In fact, it is simple. A
lengthy, complex procedure for compensating livestock owners subverts the
purpose of having a procedure in place at all. Unless a livestock owner loses
a large number of animals to the reintroduced wolves, the amount of money
involved does not justify a formal judicial hearing. Moreover, the ability of
the administrative procedure to function properly will depend on the good
faith efforts of livestock owners and FWS. If either group chooses to prove
a point, the case will likely be litigated and appealed for years to come.
PART V: CONCLUSION
Despite local opposition, the Mexican wolf is coming home. The
wolf is a valuable part of our Western heritage, and it is undoubtedly in the
citizens' best interest that the species survives. However, "a strong public
desire to improve the public condition [will not] warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." 13
The FWS knows that Mexican wolves are going to kill and eat
privately owned livestock. Yet, the agency has not proposed to compensate
these citizens for their loss. The framers promised that "Nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 137 When
citizens lose livestock to Mexican wolves, their private property has been
taken for a public purpose. Just compensation is due and the citizen should
not be required to litigate all the way to the Supreme Court to recover.
JOEL M. CARSON

136. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,396 (1994) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,416 (1922)).
137. U.S. CONSr. amend. V.

